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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Respondent

:

-vs-

'
•

THEODORE LOPES
Defendant-Appellant

Case No. 14327
•

'

•

.

•

:

-

.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Theodore Lopes, appeals from a conviction for the
crime of carrying a concealed weapon, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-504 (1953),
from a trial without jury in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon on
June 1, 1975. A trial without jury resulted in a conviction for the crime as
charged. Judge Peter F. Leary, Third Judicial District, State of Utah, pronounced
judgment on September 30, 1975. As a result, the appellant was sentenced
in accord with the law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant submits that the conviction should be dismissed, or
in the alternative that the conviction should be reversed and a new trial
granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Y

On June 1, 1975, at approximately 5:30 p. m. , Salt Lake City police
officers Harkness, Roberts, and Mendez observed the appellant and a companion, Ms. Elizabeth Berry, riding in an automobile on Second South at
approximately 400 West, The officers, having knowledge that there was an outstanding warrant for Ms. Berry's arrest, stopped the vehicle and proceeded
to effect the arrest. Officer Roberts approached the appellant and requested
to see his driver 1 s license. The appellant produced a valid Utah driver's
license. Officer Roberts detained the appellant while he returned to the patrol
car to radio the dispatcher and have an investigation of the files made to
determine if there were any bench warrants or outstanding felony warrants
out on the appellant. The check revealed that the dispatcher was in possession
of a bench warrant for the appellant's arrest, the warrant stemming from a
traffic violation. Officer Roberts returned to the appellant's vehicle and informed him he was under arrest. The appellant was then searched and the
search revealed he was carrying an unloaded pistol. Officer Roberts testified
at trial that prior to conducting the check with the dispatcher, he had no
knowledge of the appellant and that on the day in question he had not observed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the appellant violate any traffic laws.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANT'S CONTINUED DETENTION FOLLOWING
HIS PRESENTATION OF A VALID DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS
AN UNLAWFUL SEIZURE AND EVIDENCE GAINED AS A
RESULT OF SUCH UNLAWFUL SEIZURE WAS INCORRECTLY
- • ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
The United States Supreme Court has on numerous occasions recognized
that non-arrest detentions fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment and
that such detentions are constitutionally permissible only upon a showing that
the police had articulable facts from which rational inference could be drawn
that the detained individual was involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1(1968); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143(1972). Since the Court
announced its decision in Terry, state and federal courts have consistently
acknowledged that the stopping of a motorist is a seizure of the person which
must meet constitutional standards, both at its initiation and in its ultimate
scope. Lowe v. United States, 407 F. 2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969); People v. Ingle,
330 N. E. 2d 39 (N. Y. Ct. App. 1975). See generally Note, Automobile License
Checks and the Fourth Amendment, 60 Virginia Law Review 666 (1974).
While there is a split of authority on the issue of whether a traffic stop
is constitutionally permissible if its only purpose is for the inspection of a
driver's license or vehicle registration, even those courts which sanction such
stops warn that license checks are violative of Fourth Amendment standards
if they exceed the limited purpose for which they are intended. In Palmore v.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of a license inspection stop which had revealed that the operator of the vehicle
was not in possession of a legal registration. The court noted, however, that
inspections for documents could not lawfully be employed as a device for
officers to conduct investigations into possible criminal activity unrelated to the
possession of a valid license or registration.

"[Wjhen the driver has produced

his permit and registration and they are in order, he must be allowed to proceed
on his way, without being subject to further delay by police. " 290 A. 2d at 583.
In the instant case, the State contends that the appellant's stop was
justified because the officers intended to arrest his passenger, and that having
once stopped the vehicle the officers were empowered by Utah Code Ann.
§41-2-15 (1953) to request the appellant to display his driver's permit. As far
as they go, these assertions are correct. However, the State's position
fails to recognize that the Utah Motor Vehicle Code only empowers the officers
to check the license for the purpose of determining if the driver is unlawfully
operating his vehicle. It does not grant the police free reign in detaining the
motorist while they process investigatory checks with central data files.
In United States v. McDevitt, 508 F. 2d 8 (10th Cir. 1974), the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals was called upon to decide just this question. In interpreting
the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code--which is identical to Utah's, both being
adoptions of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Code--the court held that when a driver
has presented valid licensing documents and there is no reasonable suspicion
at that time that he is involved in criminal activity officers cannot lawfully
detain him further. In McDevitt, officers of the New Mexico State Police had
stopped the defendant to check his documents. In spite of the fact that they
were in orderDigitized
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McDevitt
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National Crime Information Center to determine if he was wanted on any
criminal charge. When the report came back that McDevitt was a deserter
from the Navy, the officers took him into custody, impounded his vehicle and
searched it. The search revealed 800 pounds of marijuana. In reversing the
defendant's conviction, the court held that the continued detent ion following
presentation of valid documents was unlawful, and that all evidence gained
as a result of such an unconstitutional seizure was inadmissable. The court
reiterated its earlier holding, in United States v. Fallon, 457 F. 2d 15, 18
(10th Cir. 1972), that "even an investigatory detention must be based on
reasonable ground, if not probable cause. I !
In the instant case, the officers testified at trial that the appellant
had committed no traffic violations, that he had produced a valid Utah driver's
license when asked to do so, and that the officers had no reason to believe
he was involved in any criminal activity at the time they made their stop.
(Tr. 4-5). The suggestion was made by the State at trial that the appellant was
subject to detention and search simply because he was in the presence of "a
known prostitute. " This assertion, however, is clearly erroneous as the
Supreme Court has held that merely being in the company of T'known criminals"
is not sufficient ground in itself to warrant any detention or search of an
individual. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40(1968).
The sole justification of the officers, therefore, in detaining the
appellant while they conducted the check with the dispatcher was the provision

-5-
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of the Motor Vehicle Code which requires motorists to display their licenses
upon demand. However, as the court's holding in McDeyitt demonstrates,
the so-called "display" statutes of the Motor Vehicle Code are not intended
to serve any purpose other than insuring that automobiles driven on the
highways are lawfully registered and operated by those who have proven their
competence to drive by written and practical examination.
Licensing and registration requirements of automobiles were originally
enacted as revenue producing measures. Miami v. Aronovitz,

114 So. 2d

784 (Fla. 1959). Both legislatures and courts subsequently recognized that
they served a public safety purpose. See Commonwealth v. Swanger, 307
A. 2d 875 (Pa. 1973). The purpose of the display statutes in the Motor
Vehicle Code is to allow officials to make sure these state interests are not
being circumvented by individuals driving without being properly registered
or licensed. While violation of licensing provisions is a misdemeanor, the
State's interest in inspecting the documents is essentially a civil standard-to prevent unsafe highway conditions and raise needed revenue--and any general
state interest in investigating possible criminal violations can only be satisfied
in a manner which complies with constitutional safeguards which surround all
criminal investigation, courts must give careful scrutiny to all cases where
a supposedly civil inspection results in a detection of a criminal violation
other than not meeting the requirements .which the inspection was purportedly
checking. To do otherwise is to fail to properly guarantee citizens the protections
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court recognized this,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in Carrara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and held that inspections for
housing code violations, though primarily civil in nature, should be conducted
pursuant to warrant to protect citizens

from potential abuse of discretion by

government officials acting under the guise of a "civil" inspection provision.
The necessity of this protection is manifest in the case at bar. It is
beyond question that if the appellant and his companion had been walking instead
of riding in an automobile that the police would not have been empowered to
detain the appellant and request identification with which they could check for
outstanding warrants. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-33 (Supp. 1975) provides that
an officer can stop an individual and demand identification from him only
when the officer has probable cause to believe that the individual has committed,
is committing, or is about to commit a felony. In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the
Supreme Court took the more permissive stance that an officer could detain
an individual for brief questioning when articulable facts indicated that the
person was involved in criminal activity. Under either standard, the appellant's
mere presence in the company of Ms. Berry would not be sufficient to justify
his detention, Sibron, supra, and the officers admitted there was nothing about
the appellant's conduct which suggested he was involved in any criminal activity.
The State, therefore, is asking this court to adopt a rule of criminal procedure
which would provide that motorists give up the constitutional rights they
enjoy as pedestrians for the privilege of being allowed to drive a car. Such
a holding has already been foreclosed by the Supreme Court. In Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court stated that it had "rejected the
concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege' " 403 U. S. at 374. See generally
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 Harvard Law Review 1439 (1968). Motorists and pedestrians alike have
a constitutional right to be free from all unreasonable government searches and
seizures.

Because driving is a potentially dangerous activity, and is therefore

regulated by the State, some interference of a motorist by government is not
unreasonable.

To the extent it is necessary to ensure compliance with licensing

provisions, it is not unreasonable that a motorist who has already been lawfully
stopped be asked to prove that he is entitled to drive.

However, once having

rendered that proof, the driver again stands on an equal footing with the
pedestrian.

If the standards which a r e applicable for further investigation--

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity--have not been met, then continued
detention of the motorist for that purpose is unlawful.

This is exactly the thrust

of the court's position in McDevitt, supra, and Palmore, supra.
CONCLUSION
The appellant lawfully complied with the demands of the Motor Vehicle
Code by presenting an admittedly valid license upon request.
him past this point, the police engaged in an unlawful seizure.

By detaining
It is by now

axiomatic that evidence gained through violation of theFourthAmendment is
inadmissible in a state court by application of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mappv. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318,
489 P. 2d 422 (1971). This prohibition is just as applicable to evidence
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obtained as a result of unlawful seizure as it is to that of unlawful search.
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). Therefore, the admission of
the weapon found on the person of the appellant was error, and it being sole
evidence of appellant's guilt, this Court should dismiss the conviction or
reverse and remand for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Appellant
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